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Abstract: It is statutory that creation of districts in Ghana should be determined by factors including 
particularly population size and economic viability of the areas concerned. From 1988 - 2012, the number 
of districts in the country almost doubled from 110 to 216. Similarly, population also doubled from 12 
million in 1984 to 24 million in 2010. 
An assessment of various revenue sources to the districts, however, revealed that general contributions of 
Internally Generated Funds (IGF) to the total revenue of the districts are miserably insignificant. The 
District Assemblies’ Common Fund (DACF) is specifically noted to be a major developmental fund in the 
districts than the IGF.  
Given the correspondence between population growth and the rising number of districts in the country, 
the study established that the creation of new districts in Ghana is influenced largely by population size 
to the neglect of economic viability of the areas. 
It is therefore concluded that creation of more districts in Ghana is only prudent if the economic viability 
of the areas can be guaranteed to ensure autonomy and reduce overdependence of the districts on grants 
and the DACF, in particular. 
 
Keywords: Decentralisation, District assemblies, Internally generated Funds, District Assemblies’ 
Common Fund, Population. 
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Decentralisation and Development 
Globally, local governance and decentralisation have become critical pathways in the 
quest of countries to improve upon governance and development. The rationale behind 
decentralisation in most countries since the past two decades has been to afford people 
at the grassroots the opportunity to contribute to decision making that results in 
policies, programmes and projects that impact on their lives. Such projects are meant to 
be owned by the people through their participation. According to Bebelleh and 
Nobabumah (2013), participation is an important ingredient for good governance and 
that it is a fundamental human right of people to take part in decisions that affect their 
lives. In the view of Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2006), the unprecedented move 
toward decentralized governance in many developing and transition countries in 
particular was due to perceived failure of the centralized units to deliver improved 
general welfare.    
 Indeed, it has been argued that the expectation of improved welfare or development 
from decentralisation stems from the assumptions that local governments are closer to 
the local people; know their needs and preferences; and will be more accountable and 
responsive to those needs and preferences   (Crawford 2004; Bahl and Martinez 2006; 
Ahmad et al 2008; Mogues et al 2009; Akramov and Asante 2009; Obeng-Odoom 2010; 
Petio 2013). It is obvious that the arguments for decentralisation tend to be predicated 
on the presumption that decentralisation is the vehicle for enhanced development of 
local communities. This is affirmed by Zakari (2012) and Dick-Sagoe and Djimatey (2015) 
who reveal that the main reforms regarding decentralisation in sub-Saharan Africa 
particularly in Ghana is a system of devolution which involves transfer to the districts 
the onus of local development with autonomy and responsibility to determine the 
services required, the best approach to provide them and sources and types of funds to 
execute them.    
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In her quest to accelerate development at the local level, Ghana also chose the path of 
decentralisation in her national governance structure. Indeed, article 240 of the 1992 
Constitution of Ghana provides for the country to have a system of local government 
and administration which shall, as far as practicable, be decentralized. The existence 
and practice of local governance and decentralisation in Ghana is thus institutionalised 
by the Constitution. 
Under the local government system of Ghana, the country has been divided into 
districts, municipalities and metropolises depending on the population size of an area 
for administrative and, more importantly, development-oriented purposes. These 
districts, municipalities and metropolises are thus the basic units of the decentralisation 
programme and local government system in Ghana which are statutorily mandated to 
ensuring overall development of their various areas of jurisdiction mainly through 
internally generated funds (Section 1(4) and 10(3a) of the Local Government Act, 1993 of 
Ghana (Act 462)). This certainly conforms to the presumed benefit of accelerated 
development believed to be associated with decentralisation and local governance. 
Development, as a terminology, has diverse meanings. It encompasses, among others, 
economic growth, environmental sustainability, and human well-being (See: Rapley, 
2007; Soares Jr. and Quintella 2008; Bellu, G, 2011; Schoburgh 2014).  It is, however, 
appropriate to put in perspective that in the context of decentralisation and local 
government particularly in Ghana, development largely connotes provision of 
infrastructure, facilities and municipal services at the local level which include clean 
water and sanitation, schools, clinics, roads, and waste management facilities and 
associated services (See: Osae 2009; Zakari 2012; Shirazu 2013; DACF 2014).  
It is therefore without doubt that the districts, municipalities and metropolises need to 
have the capacity to mobilise substantial and stable internal revenues before they can 
achieve the development touted to come with decentralisation and local government.  
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In this paper, the term district(s) is/are used to refer to the three (3) local government 
units in Ghana (i.e. districts, municipalities and metropolises). This is chosen since the 
three (3) are said to be essentially equal in power and given equal consideration in any 
discussion (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Ghana and the Institute of Local Government 
Studies (ILGS), Ghana (2010)). 
Statement of the Problem 
In recognition of the enormous financial requirement of districts to propel development 
in their areas of jurisdiction, Act 462 (Section 1(2)) in empowering the President of the 
Republic, by executive instrument, to declare an area as a district, further enjoins the 
President in the exercise of such power to obtain appropriate recommendations from 
the Electoral Commission. According to Section 1(4) of Act 462, the recommendations 
should be informed by factors, including: 
 
a) In the case of 
i) a district, that there is a minimum population of seventy-five thousand 
(75,000) people; 
ii) a municipality, that the geographical area consists of a single compact 
settlement and that there is a minimum of ninety-five thousand (95,000) 
people;  
iii) a metropolis, that there is a minimum of two hundred and fifty thousand 
(250,000) people; and  
b) the geographical contiguity and economic viability of the area, namely, the 
ability of an area to provide the basic infrastructural and any other 
developmental needs from the monetary and other resources generated in the 
area. 
The law (Act 462) therefore makes it contingent on the President in exercising the 
discretionary power to create a district to first ensure, through the advice of the 
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Electoral Commission, that the area has the stipulated population size and, secondly, 
that it is economically viable in terms of its ability to mobilise internal revenue and 
other internal resources for its own development. Thus, according to Act 642, the 
development of a district is to be primarily and largely financed from internally 
generated revenues and other resources mobilised from within the area or district. 
Of the two preconditions, it is obvious that the population requirement for an area to be 
declared a district does not require any effort to attain particularly since Ghana, 
according to the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) (2013), has a high annual population 
growth rate of about 2.5 percent. The second condition of economic viability of the area 
is however very critical and constitutes a determinant of the functionality of the districts 
as they are supposed to be autonomous and statutorily responsible for the overall 
development of their areas of jurisdiction mainly through internally generated funds 
(IGF). 
It is therefore the focus of this study to ascertain the statutory requirement of economic 
viability of districts in Ghana so as to provide basis for an informed, valid and reliable 
conclusion on whether or not it is worthwhile and sustainable to create more districts in 
Ghana. 
 Objectives of the Study 
The specific objectives of the study are to: 
 assess the relative contribution of IGF and grants to the total revenue of the 
districts; 
 assess the percentage of IGF to DACF in the districts; 
 assess the contribution of DACF to total grants of the districts; and 
 draw conclusion on whether or not it is worthwhile to create more districts in 
Ghana.   
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Methodology 
The study relied on both quantitative and qualitative secondary data from published 
and unpublished sources such as journals, conference papers, newsletters, 
dissertations/theses, national surveys or reports relating to the subject matter and more 
importantly annual trial balances or final accounts of the districts. 
Revenues of three (3) selected districts, namely the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly 
(KMA) in the Ashanti Region, the Kassena Nankana Municipal Assembly (KNMA) in 
the Upper East Region and the Abura Asebu Kwamankese District Assembly (AAKDA) 
in the Central Region are examined to determine the relative contributions of Internally 
Generated Funds (IGF), the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) and other 
grants in the running and funding of development in the districts of Ghana. 
The selection of the aforementioned regions was to reflect the various ecological zones 
of the country (i.e. northern/savanna, southern/forest and coastal zones) taking into 
account the different socio-economic characteristics of the three zones (See: GSS 2008; 
Yeboah and Obeng-Odoom, 2010). Selection of the districts was influenced by 
availability of secondary data coupled with the intention of the study to have one 
representation each of the three (3) local government units in the country i.e. district, 
municipality and metropolis. 
Trend of Population Growth in Ghana 
Just like most developing countries, the population of Ghana has been rising very fast 
over the years. According to the National Population Council (2011), the first post-
independence population census in 1960 recorded a population of 6.7 million. From 
1960 -2010, the population has more than tripled from 6.7million to 24.6million (GSS, 
2013). The table below provides details on the trend of growth and doubling time of the 
population. 
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Table 1: Population Growth and Doubling Time in Ghana 
Year Population 
1960 6,726,815 
1970 8,559,313 
1984 12,296,081 
2000 18,912,079 
2010 24,658,823 
Period Doubling Time (in years) 
1960-1970 29 
1970-1984 27 
1984-2000 26 
2000-2010 28 
Source: GSS, 2013 
 
   The population is thus noted to double every 25 years with the doubling time between 
2000-2010 being 28 years. Furthermore, the annual growth rate of the population for 
1960 – 2010 has ranged from 2.4 to 2.7 per cent with that specifically for the period 2000 
– 2010 being 2.5 per cent (GSS, 2013). 
It is evident from the statistics that Ghana, indeed, experiences a rapid growth in her 
population and obvious that any intervention that would merely require population as 
a pre-requisite would easily be undertaken.  
Creation of New Districts in Ghana 
Major reforms to the decentralisation programme in the country took place with the 
passage of the PNDC Law 207 in 1988. This, according to FES and ILGS (2010), led to a 
re-demarcation of the country resulting in an increase in the number of districts at the 
time from 65 to 110. Since then, the 110 districts have increased to 216. The table below 
by Ayee 2012 cited in Mensah et al (2015) provides a summary of the trend of creation 
of new districts in Ghana. 
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Table 2: Trend of Creation of New Districts in Ghana 
Year No. of Districts No. of additional 
(new) Districts 
Created 
Total Percentage Increase 
Before 1988 65 45 110 69.2 
2004 110 28 138 25.5 
2008 138 32 170 23.2 
2012 170 46 216 27.1 
Source: Ayee (2012) cited in Mensah et al (2015) 
Comparing the sequence and increases in the number of districts vis-à-vis the 
population trend in the country, it can be noted that it took 24 years for the 110 districts 
which existed in 1988 to almost double to 216 districts in 2012. This corresponds with 
the doubling of the country’s population from 12.2 million in 1984 to 24.6 million in 
2010, a period of 26 years, which is virtually in line with the time period it took for the 
districts to double.  
Aside the influence of population in the creation of new districts, it is important to note 
the view of Swanzy (2015) that most districts created in Ghana after 1992 (that is when 
the country started practising multi-party democracy) seemed to have been done to 
fulfill political party election promises and win votes of particular constituents rather 
than to decentralise governance in the country. 
Sources of Funding Development at the Districts 
Districts in Ghana are empowered by the country’s 1992 constitution and the Local 
Government Act 1993 (Act 462) to raise or mobilize revenue for their overall 
development. Revenues or funding to the districts are broadly grouped into two: 1) 
Internally generated revenues / funds (IGF) and 2) intergovernmental or central 
government or external transfers or grants.  
Internally Generated Revenues/Funds (IGF): These are locally mobilised or raised 
revenues from within the jurisdictional area of a district. The sources of the IGF have 
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been provided by Act 462 to comprise property rates, rent, lands, investments, fees and 
fines, and licenses. Studies have however shown that the districts are weak and 
incapable of raising adequate IGF for development leading to their overdependence on 
grants which erodes their accountability and autonomy (Inanga, E. O. and Osei Wusu, 
D. 2004; Mensah 2005; Mogues at al 2009; Petio 2013; Bandie 2015).  It is additionally 
noted that where grants constitute a greater portion of local government revenue, the 
local governments (i.e. the districts) tend to become inefficient due to the fact that the 
funds may be erratic and often come as tied grants (Petio 2013; Adu-Gyamfi, E. 2015).  
Sources of Grants  
District Assemblies’ Common Fund (DACF): This is a statutory fund, of not less than 5 
percent (reviewed in 2007 to 7.5 percent) of total annual revenues of the country established 
under article 252 of the Constitution (1992) which is distributed among all the districts in 
quarterly installments, on the basis of a formula approved by Parliament. The DACF is said to 
constitute a major and in many districts the highest source of revenue (Mensah et al 2015) and 
also the most reliable form of grant from the central government to the districts (Shirazu, 2013). 
In some districts, the DACF (2014) reveals that the DACF covers about 80-90 percent of annual 
expenditure. Even with the enormous contribution of the DACF, Mogues et al (2009) argue that 
the 5 percent (currently 7.5 percent) share of subnational (i.e. the districts) to total spending in 
Ghana compares unfavorably with, for example, 29 percent in Bolivia; 34 percent in South 
Africa and 25 percent in Kyrgyztan.  
Other Grants 
Beside the DACF, there are a number of other grants available to the districts in Ghana. 
These include Urban Development Grant (UDG), HIPC funds, donor support, and more 
importantly the District Development Facility (DDF). Among these other grants, the 
DDF is of great importance due to its developmental impact on education, sanitation, 
health and roads in most Ghanaian districts.  
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District Development Facility (DDF): This is a performance-based grant or fund 
created by the Government of Ghana with support of her development partners to 
provide districts with additional developmental funding (Akurugu, 2013). An annual 
evaluation mechanism called the Functional and Organisational Assessment Tool 
(FOAT) is used to assess the performance of the districts to determine their eligibility 
for the grant or the quantum of the fund a district is eligible to (Akurugu, 2013). 
According to Farvacque-Vitkovic et al (2008), the DDF seeks to strengthen institutional 
performance of districts by linking access to discretionary development fund with 
regular performance assessments and capacity building support. For the period 2009-
2012, Janus (2014) reveals that an amount of 211.45 million US dollars accrued to the 
DDF out of which the Government of Ghana only contributed 66 million US dollars. 
This therefore means that about 70 percent of the financial contributions from 2009-2012 
to the DDF largely came from the development partners. Janus (2014) lists the 
development partners to comprise the Agence Francaise de Developpement (AFD) of 
France, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA), and the German Development Bank (KFW). 
With respect to developmental funding to the districts in the country, it is revealed that 
the districts receive about 70 percent of their budget from the DACF, 15 percent from 
the DDF and only 15 percent from IGF (Janus, 2014). 
Analysis of Data 
This section examines quantitative secondary data on the revenues of the three (3) 
selected districts for four (4) consecutive years i.e. 2007-2010. The revenues for each of 
the three (3) districts have been categorised into IGF, DACF and other grants for the 
analyses and are explained below. 
Evaluation of Revenues of Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) 
Table 1A contains actual revenue figures of the KMA for the period 2007 – 2010. Three 
(3) complementary tables have additionally been generated from the data on table 1A. 
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These are table 2A, table 3A and table 4A each of which respectively contains the 
percentage contribution of the various revenue categories to the total revenue of the 
assembly, percentage of IGF to DACF and the percentage contribution of DACF to the 
total grants of the district. 
Revenue Sources to the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly 
Table 1A: Composition of revenues (in Gh₵) to the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly 
(KMA) 
           Year 
Source 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
IGF 3,721,609.96 4,912,219.46 6,097,223.15 12,157,111.74 
DACF 2,599,455.75 
 
2,449,288.37 
 
3,851,368.40 2,782,583.97 
Other grants 5,170,971.16 3,396,760.67 6,154,234.18 7,281,963.41 
Total Revenue 11,492,036.87 10,758,268.50 16,102,825.73 22,221,659.12 
Source: Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly’s Annual Trial Balances (2007-2010) cited in 
Adam 2011 
 
Table 2A: Contribution (in %) of revenue by various components 
           Year 
Source 
2007 2008 2009 2010 Annual Average 
IGF 32.40 45.70 37.90 54.70 42.68 
DACF 22.60 22.80 23.90 12.50 20.45 
Other grants 45.00 31.60 38.20 32.80 36.90 
Total (%) 100.00 100.10 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author’s calculations from Adam 2011  
From the above tables (1A & 2A), the KMA in 2007 realized a total revenue of Gh₵11, 
492,036.87. Out of this, IGF constituted 32.40 percent, DACF representing 22.60 percent 
whiles other grants made up 45 percent of the total revenue of the assembly. In 2008, 
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there was an increase in the percentage contribution of IGF to 45.7 percent of the total 
revenue of Gh₵10, 758,268.50 realised by the assembly with contributions of DACF and 
other grants constituting 22.80 percent and 31.60 per cent respectively. For the years 
2009 and 2010, the percentage contributions of IGF to the total revenues for the 
respective years were 37.90 percent and 54.70 percent. For the same years, the DACF 
contributed 23.90 percent in 2009 and 12.50 percent in 2010 to the total revenues of the 
assembly whilst other grants raked in 38.20 percent and 32.80 percent to the 2009 and 
2010 total revenues of the assembly respectively. 
As a summary therefore, the annual average percentage contributions of the various 
revenue sources for the period 2007 to 2010 for the KMA were 42.68 percent for IGF, 
20.45 percent for DACF and 36.90 percent for other grants. In effect, over the period of 
2007-2010, grants constituted about 57 percent of the total revenue or funding to the 
running and development of the KMA.  
Percentage of IGF to DACF of the KMA 
Table 3A examines further the relative contribution of IGF and DACF to the 
administration and development of the KMA. The assessment is on the basis of the 
actual figures of the two revenue sources. This analysis is intended to determine 
whether the DACF is actually being an external supplementary revenue source to the 
assembly or it has, in quantum, been consistently higher than the assembly’s IGF and 
thus become the major revenue source for development funding in the district. 
Over the four year period as can be seen in the table below, IGF of the KMA has 
consistently exceeded the DACF. Specifically, IGF exceeded the DACF by 43.17 percent 
in 2007, 100.56 percent in 2008, 58.31 percent in 2009 and 336.90 percent in 2010. 
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Table 3A: Percentage of IGF to DACF of the KMA 
       Year 
Source 
2007 2008 2009 2010 Annual 
Average 
IGF 3,721,609.96 4,912,219.46 6,097,223.15 12,157,111.74 6,722,041.08 
DACF 2,599,455.75 2,449,288.37 3,851,368.40 2,782,583.97 2,920,674.12 
% of IGF 143.17 200.56 158.31 436.90 230.15 
Source: Author’s Construct from Adam 2011 
On the average, KMA’s IGF exceeded its DACF by 130 percent between 2007 and 2010. 
This may imply that the KMA can undertake reasonable development interventions 
from its IGF. 
Percentage Contribution of DACF to Total Grants of the KMA 
At this point, the study intends to examine the contribution of the DACF as a fixed-rate 
constitutionally guaranteed developmental grant to the total grants of the KMA. This is 
to determine the weight or impact, in percentage terms, of the DACF on the total grants 
of the assembly. 
From table 4A, the percentage contributions of the DACF to total grants of the KMA for 
2007-2010 were 33.45 percent, 41.90 percent, 38.49 percent and 27.65 percent 
respectively.   
 
Table 4A: Contribution (in %) of DACF to Total Grants  
            Year      
Source 
2007 2008 2009 2010 Annual 
Average 
DACF 2,599,455.75 2,449,288.37 3,851,368.40 2,782,583.97  2,920,674.12 
Total Grants 7,770,426.91 5,846,049.04 10,005,602.58 10,064,547.38 8,421,656.48 
% of DACF 33.45 41.90 38.49 27.65 34.68 
Source: Author’s calculations from KMA Annual Trial Balances cited in Adam 2011 
The annual average percentage contribution of the DACF to total grants for the 4 year 
duration is further assessed to constitute 34.68 percent.  
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Abura Asebu Kwamankese District 
Evaluation of Revenues of Abura Asebu Kwamankese District Assembly (AAKDA) 
From tables 1B and 2B, the annual average percentage contributions of the various 
revenue sources for the period 2007 to 2010 for the AAKDA were 6.28 percent for IGF, 
52.54 percent for DACF and 41.17 percent for other grants. 
Table 1B: Composition of revenues to the Abura Asebu Kwamankese District Assembly    
                   (AAKD) 
           Year 
Source 
2007 2008 
 
2009 2010 
IGF 50,077.20 87,864.70 90,431.75 74,644.17 
DACF 446,918.02 
 
308,175.86 
 
477,105.52 750,543.47 
Other grants 341,401.97 430,262.79 271,541.31 1,986,672.27 
Total 
Revenue 
838,397.19 826,303.35 839,078.58 2,811,859.91 
Source: Abura Asebu Kwamankese District Assembly’s (AAKDA) 2012 Composite 
Budget and AAKDA’s Annual Trial Balances (2005- 2010) cited in Dick-Sagoe and 
Djimatey, 2015. 
Table 2B: Contribution (in %) of revenue by various components 
          Year 
Source 
2007 2008 2009 2010 Annual Average 
IGF 5.97 10.63 10.78 2.65 6.28 
DACF 53.31 37.30 56.86 26.69 52.54 
Other grants 40.72 52.07 32.36 70.65 41.17 
Total (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author’s calculations from Dick-Sagoe and Djimatey, 2015 and AAKDA’s 2012 
Composite Budget 
180                                                    Journal of Studies in Social Sciences 
It is thus obvious from the above statistics that the development of AAKDA practically 
depends entirely on grants since the DACF and other grants overwhelmingly represent 
about 94 percent of funding to the district.  
Percentage of IGF to DACF of the AAKDA 
From table 3B below, IGF of the AAKDA has consistently been insignificant compared 
to the DACF. This results in an equally very low annual average IGF percentage to 
DACF of about 15 percent. 
Table 3B: Percentage of IGF to DACF of the AAKDA 
        Year 
Source 
2007 2008 2009 2010 Annual 
Average 
IGF 50,077.20 
 
87,864.70 90,431.75 74,644.17 75,754.46 
DACF 446,918.02 
 
308,175.86 477,105.52 750,543.47 495,685.72 
% of IGF 11.21 28.51 18.95 9.95 15.28 
Source: Author’s calculations from Dick-Sagoe and Djimatey, 2015 and AAKDA’s 2012 
Composite Budget 
 
Percentage Contribution of DACF to Total Grants of the AAKDA 
The percentage contributions of the DACF to total grants of the AAKDA for 2007, 2008, 
2009 and 2010 were 56.69 percent, 41.73 percent, 63.73 percent and 27.42 percent 
respectively.  See details in table 4B. 
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Table 4B: Contribution (in %) of DACF to Total Grants 
        Year 
Source 
2007 2008 2009 2010 Annual 
Average 
DACF 446,918.02 
 
308,175.86 477,105.52 750,543.47 495,685.72 
Total grants 788,319.99 
 
738,438.65 748,646.83 2,737,215.74 1,253,155.30 
% of DACF 56.69 41.73 63.73 27.42 39.55  
Source: Author’s calculations from Dick-Sagoe and Djimatey, 2015 and AAKDA’s 2012   
 Composite Budget 
The annual average percentage contribution of the DACF to total grants for the 4 year 
duration represents 39.55 percent.  
Kassena Nankana Municipal Assembly (KNMA) 
Revenue Components of the KNMA 
In the KNMA, the annual average percentage contributions of the various revenue 
sources for the period 2007 to 2010 are 6.57 percent for IGF, 39.72 percent for DACF and 
53.71 percent for other grants. 
It is thus evident that the KNMA is also practically dependent on grants. This is because 
93 percent of funding to the district is grants i.e. the DACF and other grants. The details 
are provided in tables 1C and 2C. 
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Table 1C: Composition of revenues (in Gh₵) to the Kassena Nankana Municipal 
Assembly (KNMA)  
         Year 
Source 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
IGF 169,349.43 173,935.28 119,857.52 145,073.37 
DACF 755,376.81 
 
988,395.42 
 
970,169.01 986,983.53 
Other 
grants 
1,214,467.86 970,284.68 954,944.20 2,181,646.36 
Total 
Revenue 
2,139,194.10 2,132,615.38 2,044,970.73 3,313,703.26 
Source: Kassena Nankana Municipal Assembly’s Annual Final Accounts (2007-2010) 
 
Table 2C: Contribution (in %) of revenue by various components 
               Year         
Source 
2007 2008 2009 2010 Annual 
Average 
IGF 7.90 8.16 5.86 4.34 6.57 
DACF 35.30 46.34 47.44 29.78 39.72 
Other grants 56.80 45.50 46.70 65.84 53.71 
Total (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100 
Source: Author’s calculation from KNMA’s Annual Final Accounts (2007-2010) 
 
Percentage of IGF to DACF of the KNMA 
Again, just as in the case of AAKDA, the IGF of the KNMA has also been consistently 
insignificant compared to the assembly’s DACF resulting in an equally very low annual 
average IGF percentage to DACF of about 16 percent. For the details, look at table 3C. 
This seems to paint a picture that the KNMA is incapable of mobilising adequate and 
sustainable internal funds for development. It is even further evident from the data that 
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the DACF which is a constitutionally guaranteed fund to supplement districts’ IGF has 
rather become the major development fund for the KNMA. 
Table 3C: Percentage of IGF to DACF of the KNMA 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from KNMA’s Final Accounts (2007-2010) 
 
Percentage Contribution of DACF to Total Grants of the KMA 
For the period 2007 to 2010 as contained in table 4C, the annual average contribution of 
the DACF to total grants of the KNMA is about 41 percent. This certainly results from 
the very significant yearly percentage contribution of the DACF to total grants which 
ranged from 31 percent to 50 percent. 
It is clear from the above that the contribution of the DACF to total grants of the KNMA 
is very significant just as in the case of AAKDA and cannot therefore be downplayed. 
Table 4C: Contribution (in %) of DACF to Total Grants 
        Year 
Source 
2007 2008 2009 2010 Annual 
Average 
DACF 755,376.81 988,395.42 
 
970,169.01 986,983.53 925,231.19 
Total grants 1,969,844.67 
 
1,958,680.10 1,925,113.21 3,168,629.89 2,255,566.97 
% of DACF 38.35 50.46 50.40 31.15 41.02 
Source: Author’s calculations from KNMA’s Final Accounts (2007-2010) 
 
        Year 
Source 
2007 2008 2009 2010 Annual 
Average 
IGF 169,349.43 
 
173,935.28 119,857.52 145,073.37 152,053.90 
DACF 755,376.81 
 
988,395.42 
 
970,169.01 986,983.53 925,231.19 
% of IGF 22.50 17.60 12.35 14.70 16.43 
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Findings and Discussions 
Scantily Low Contribution of IGF to Total Revenue of the Districts  
From the study, it is established that, generally, the contribution of IGF to total revenue 
of districts in Ghana is insignificant. With the exception of the KMA which experienced 
almost 43 percent IGF contribution to the total revenue of the assembly for the 4 year 
duration, the IGF of the remaining two districts for the same period i.e. the AAKDA 
and KNMA, only contributed paltry rates of about 6 percent and 7 percent respectively 
to the total revenues of the two districts. 
It is evident therefore that the existing districts are not economically viable as they do 
not have the ability to mobilise substantial internal revenues for development. This is 
affirmed by a number of studies including Inanga and Osei Wusu (2004); Mensah (2005); 
Mogues at al (2009); Petio (2013); and Bandie (2015) which established earlier that 
districts in the country are weak and unable to mobilise adequate internal revenues for 
development and as a result rely heavily on grants to function. This finding of scantily 
low IGF to total revenue of the districts reveals further that the requirement of 
economic viability of an area specified in Act 462 as a precondition for declaring the 
area a district is not even met or satisfied by the existing districts. Worryingly, more 
new districts have been created in total disregard of addressing the key issue of 
economic viability of the existing districts. This gives credence to the assertion by 
Swanzy (2015) that the creation of most districts in Ghana after 1992 appeared to have 
been done primarily for political expediency rather than to decentralise governance in 
the country. 
Low Percentage of IGF to DACF of the Districts 
As regards the percentage of IGF to DACF, the study reveals that it is only the KMA 
which has consistently mobilized internal revenues far in excess of its DACF. 
Specifically, over the four (4) year period, IGF of the KMA far exceeded its DACF by 130 
percent. The case is however pathetically different for the AAKDA and the KNMA. For 
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the AAKDA, the IGF constituted just about 15 percent of the DACF for the four (4) year 
period and that of the KNMA also representing only about 16 percent for the same 
period. It therefore implies that for the AAKDA and the KNMA, the DACF contributes 
about 85 percent and 84 percent respectively of development funding over their IGFs. 
The very high percentage of DACF over the districts’ IGFs confirmed the assertions by 
Janus (2014) and Mensah et al (2015) that the DACF constitutes a major and in many 
districts the highest source of revenue for developmental financing. It is also true the finding of 
the DACF (2014) that the DACF covers 80-90 percent of annual expenditure in some districts. 
Furthermore, given the fact that the DACF constitutes about 80 percent of funding to 
the districts, it is important to reiterate that the DACF is the only supplementary 
guaranteed grant at a fixed rate of 7.5 percent of annual national revenues of the 
country that is shared or allocated, on quarterly basis, to all the districts and so the more 
new districts are created, which obviously would depend on it, the less the quarterly 
allocations and the developmental impact the DACF can bring to the districts.  
DACF, a Major Contributor to Total Grants of the Districts 
Even though it has been established that the districts depend on grants to function, the 
DACF as the only constitutionally guaranteed development grant has further been 
noted to be a major contributor to the total grants (i.e. the DACF plus other grants) of 
the districts. With respect to the three (3) districts studied, the DACF in the four (4) year 
period contributed about 35 percent, 40 percent and 41 percent respectively to the total 
grants of the KMA, the AAKDA and the KNMA.  
On the average, the DACF therefore singly constitutes about 40 percent of the 
multiplicity of grants to the districts in Ghana and as already indicated, being a fixed 
rate of 7.5 percent of annual national revenues allocated quarterly to all districts, the 
developmental impact of the DACF is undermined with creation of more districts that 
cannot capably mobilise adequate internal revenues for their own development. 
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Creation of New Districts largely influenced by Population size and not Economic 
viability 
The study also found out that the trend of creation of new districts in the country is 
influenced largely by population size rather than economic viability of the areas. Given 
both trends of creation of new districts and population growth as provided by Ayee 
(2012) cited Mensal et al (2015) and the GSS (2013) respectively, Ghana would have 
about 432 districts in 2038, that is the next 28 years (the average doubling time of the 
country’s population) from 2010, if population size continues to largely influence the 
creation of new districts. Such a high number of districts would definitely be 
unsustainable since the DACF which is the main funding source to the districts is only a 
fixed rate of annual national revenues distributed quarterly to all the districts. 
Conclusion 
Generally, the study established that the contribution of IGF to the total revenue of 
districts in Ghana is miserably insignificant for development and as a consequence, the 
districts almost wholly depend on grants particularly the DACF for development. This 
undeniably proves a point that the districts are not economically viable since they are 
unable to provide basic infrastructural and other developmental needs from monetary 
and other resources generated within their areas of jurisdiction. In spite of this, many 
more new districts have been created over the years - that continue to depend largely 
on grants especially the DACF - without regard to first actually ascertaining the 
statutory requirement of economic viability of the areas as provided for in Section 1 (4) 
of the Local Government Act, 1993, Act 462. It needs to be emphasised that the 
requirement of economic viability is a determinant of functionality and autonomy of the 
districts such that where economic viability cannot be guaranteed, then the districts 
automatically lose their autonomy in deciding on their developmental priorities and the 
time to undertake them. Furthermore, as the districts depend largely on grants to 
function, decentralisation cannot also be said to be truly responsive and accountable to 
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the needs of the local people since the districts might sometimes be dictated to as a 
condition for the grants which invariably might not conform to the developmental 
priorities and needs of the people. 
Relatedly, though grants are noted to be the major source of budgetary funding to the 
districts, it has been ascertained that the DACF which is a constitutionally guaranteed 
grant of 7.5 per cent of annual national revenues alone constitutes about 40 per cent of 
the multiplicity of grants to the districts. Given this together with the fact that the DACF 
is the major developmental fund to the districts, creation of more districts that are not 
economically viable would put extra stress on the DACF and thus undermine its 
developmental impact in the districts. 
Beyond all the above, it is particularly necessary to again draw attention to the 
worrying phenomenon that the creation of new districts over the years has been 
dictated by population size to the neglect of the requirement of economic viability of the 
areas. For new districts to actually live up to their statutory obligation of ensuring 
development at their territorial areas, it is imperative that the requirement of economic 
viability should rather always be given top priority over population size in the creation 
of new districts.  
In the light of these revelations, it would therefore only be prudent to create more 
districts in Ghana if the economic viability of the areas can be guaranteed to ensure 
functionality and autonomy of the new districts. There is need for capacity building for 
the existing districts to improve upon internal revenue mobilization to lessen their over-
reliance on the DACF. 
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